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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
At the end of several months of work  we  are in a position to  propose, as  a basis for 
further reflection by the EU authorities, a series of approaches which could become the 
broad  lines  of a  policy  for  the  Union  in  its  relations  with  the  CEEC  on  matters 
concerning agriculture and food production. Our general conclusions are as follows: 
1)  The  steadily  declining situation of agriculture in  the  CEEC  cannot continue 
without some reaction by  the EU. It is too  dangerous for the stability of the 
CEEC  and for the EU's relations with the various countries. 
2)  We  are  obliged  to  view  the  problem  in  macroeconomic  terms.  Without  a 
globally healthy system of farm production, i.e. a system potentially capable of 
providing  an  income  for  the  producers,  all  the  different  forms  of aid  and 
assistance  will  be  merely  palliative,  and  microeconomic  decisions,  however 
intelligent, will be doomed to fail. 
3)  We are convinced that the only effective way of  improving the situation rapidly 
is  to  set  up  a  system  of price  stabilization  for  agricultural  commodities. 
Although such  a system cannot be put in place immediately  and  in  full,  the 
legal and institutional infrastructure for it must be set up. 
4)  Without  delay,  the  EU must  set  itself the objective of helping  each  of the 
CEEC  - according to its level of development - to lay the foundations of an 
agricultural policy compatible with the reformed CAP. 
5)  To accomplish this work in preparation for the accession negotiations, the EU 
must define its doctrine rapidly and announce it; it must also provide itself with 
the necessary human and institutional resources. 
The following report presents the analysis which led us to the above conclusions and 
proposes some concrete measures. The implementation of some of these can be decided 
by the Union itself. 4 
The more concrete recommendations are as follows: 
I)  Measures are required to give assurances to agricultural producers that they will 
be  recompensed  for  the  inputs,  such  as  fuel,  machinery,  fertilizers,  seeds, 
herbicides/insecticides, which they must buy for normal production, along with 
a marginal compensation for their labour. 
It is  suggested that these assurances can be given through a system of price 
supports at a low level. Emanating from this, a simplified system of EU levies 
and  refunds  for  the  CEEC,  based  on  these  price  support  levels,  could  be 
instituted.  By  making  the  EU  levies  equal  to  refunds,  a  form  of common 
agricultural market would be formed which would recognize the differences in 
cost prices only through these levies and refunds. 
2)  Measures are required to liquefy the agricultural economy and to create markets 
in agricultural land in order to advance the gradual restructuring of agricultural 
production once it becomes potentially profitable. It is suggested that land can 
be used as  collateral for loans through a "land bank".  This "land bank"  could 
also own land for resale, in order to regulate land prices and to  promote the 
creation  of viable production  units.  Such  "land banks"  could be  created in 
cooperation with CEEC governments, the EBRD and the World Bank. 
3)  Measures are required to accompany a process of  gradual convergence between 
agriculture in the EU and in the CEEC.  These measures would aim,  via the 
promotion of regular contacts between officials and professionals from  both 
sides, to make effective use of trade opportunities and to eliminate unnecessary 
friction in areas such as veterinary and plant health matters. They would also 
encompass regular exchanges of views on market trends, on the working of the 
CAP and agricultural policies in the CEEC. Ways to enforce the contribution 
of the agricultural  components of the PHARE programme to  the process of 
gradual convergence should also be explored under this heading. 5 
INTRODUCTION 
Since  the  collapse  of the  controlled  economies  of Central  and  Eastern  Europe  the 
question  of the  EU's  relations,  now  and  in  the  future,  with  the  former  communist 
countries has become a focus of attention among the people and leaders of the EU and 
CEEC.  The EU reacted rapidly to the situation in that, in the early stages, association 
agreements and aid programmes were proposed and launched, after which the prospect 
of  the future participation of the CEEC in the EU was clearly stated. On 21  and 22 June 
1993  the  Heads  of State  and  of Government  meeting  in  Copenhagen  issued  the 
following statement: 
"The  European  Council today  agreed that  the  associated countries  in  Central and 
Eastern  Europe]  that  so  desire  shall  become  members of the  European  Union. 
Accession will take place as  soon  as  an  associated country  is  able  to  assume  the 
obligations  of membership  by  satisfying  the  economic  and political  conditions 
required. " 
This political objective was well  received in the CEEC  and has since constituted the 
main - in some cases the sole - plank of their foreign policies2. And there is no doubt 
that the  prospect of the  enlargement of the  EU to  several  countries of Central  and 
Eastern Europe which form an unquestionable and profound part of  our common history 
offers great promise and hope for the future progress of our common enterprise. 
For the executive authorities of the EU it is necessary to begin preparing now for this 
further  enlargement of the  Union  to  countries  which  are  in  transition  between  an 
administratively centralized economic system and a market economy, at a particularly 
difficult time for the system of international economic relations.  The situation has no 
precedent from which to draw inspiration, and there is no theory to provide guidance 
for  those  actively  involved.  Automatic  and  dogmatic  transposition  of adjustment 
strategies has already shown its limitations and a pragmatic approach seems to be the 
only way.  Step by  step we must evolve practical responses to unforeseen or surprising 
developments.  In the context of this approach,  diagnosis is  an  important part of the 
reasontng process. 
1  Bulgaria,  Hungary,  Poland,  Romania,  Czechoslovakia (today  the  Czech  Republic and 
Slovak Republic) 
2  Hungary  and  Poland  applied  for  membership  on  I  April  1994  and  5  April  1994 
respectively. 6 
The following  analysis of the present situation of farming in  the CEEC  is  based on 
information collated from  several souces:  documents from  international organizations 
(OECD,  World  Bank,  European  Union),  numerous  contacts  with  political  and 
administrative authorities and researchers in the CEEC, conversations with specialists 
in DG I and DG VI and certain Member States, and, lastly, fact-finding tours in all the 
countries concerned. 
I. SITUATION AND OUTLOOK 
A.  Some prejudices  ... 
Whenever  the  subject  of EU/CEEC  relations  in  matters  concerning  farming  and 
agricultural processing is raised it is quite clear that certain political leaders and most 
prominent  representatives  of the  agricultural  sector  view  the  CEEC  primarily  as 
dangerous  competitors  for  the  protected  farming  sectors  of the  EU.  This  confused 
response springs first and foremost from past experience, when the countries referred 
to as the East-bloc countries regularly exported a few specific products3 to the countries 
of the EU, and more recent memories when the beef herds in Poland and former East 
Germany were run down, giving rise to severe disturbances on the beef market of the 
EU, which is always in surplus and always fragile4. This standard attitude is reinforced 
by  the  widely  held belief that the CEEC  will  keep  trying indefinitely to  supply  the 
market with primary farm products and fairly simply produced food products for which 
they enjoy a comparatively advantageous position by virtue, in particular, of low labour 
costs5. 
This opinion, which naturally does nothing to  dispel  a somewhat cool  attitude to the 
CEEC,  can  readily  find justification  in  more scientific  geographical  and  agronomic 
arguments:  the  EU  and  CEEC  belong  to  the  same  large  geographical  area,  where 
geological and climatological similarities are sufficiently numerous and pronounced as 
to  give rise to  identical, i.e. potentially  competitive,  agricultural  enterprises.  Cereals, 
milk,  all  types  of meat,  fruit,  vegetables  and  wine,  which  are  already  produced 
abundantly or over-abundantly in the EU, are also the principal farm enterprises of the 
CEEC. The logical corollary of this is that complementary enterprises are few or non-
existent.  There  can  be no  illusions  in  this  respect  :  it is not the CEEC which will 
3  cured meats, foie gras, certain fruits 
4  This phenomenon, due to sudden partial destruction of beef herds, is no longer producing 
effects. 
5  Article by Ulrich Koestler concerning the potentialities and handicaps of agricultural trade 
with the CEEC countries (Agrarwirtschaft 42 (1993), vol.  12, pp 429-436). 7 
supply the EU with the plant protein it needs for its livestock sector. The agricultural 
industries of  Western and Eastern Europe could therefore find themselves in competition 
on the already glutted markets for the main farm products. This hypothesis is all  the 
more  conceivable  since  the  productive  potential  of Poland,  Hungary,  Bulgaria  and 
Romania  could  make  the  area  "one  of the  greatest  exporters  of the  world"6.  But 
potential can take a long time before it is realized: for instance, for more than a century, 
all the treatises on rural economics have cited Argentina as the great farming power of 
the  future,  given  its  exceptional  "potential"7,  but  it  is  still  not  realized;  cereals 
production has still not increased. 
Realization of potential  is not a technical  matter as  the  agronomists  and production 
engineers imagine, nor is  it the result of an  optimal mix of inputs as  the economists 
make out; it is the outcome of a long and complex social  process in  which relations 
between the farming sector and the rest of society play a predominant role in raising 
agricultural production and productivity. The history of farming in Western Europe is 
a good illustration in this respect: the periods of growth of farm productivity coincide 
with the periods of industrialization, urbanization and capital accumulation in society 
as  a whole. 
From this point of view, the conditions for the realization of agricultural potential in the 
CEEC are not fulfilled, and there is every indication that it will be a slow process. The 
available figures, whose reliability depends on the quality of  the data gathering systems 
concerned,  show  that  agricultural  production  declined  by  at  least  30%8  in  all  the 
relevant  countries  between  1988  and  1992.  This  decline  is  obviously  linked  to  the 
comparable decline in consumption. The collapse of  production is confirmed by certain 
realities observed at field level  and we  think that the considerable capacities for farm 
and  food  production  in  Poland,  Hungary  and  Bulgaria  in  particular  are  lastingly 
impaired and that, for a fairly long time to come, it will be the farm and food products 
from the EU countries which may seriously disturb farming in the CEEC rather than the 
reverse. 
6  Ulrich Koestler, op.cit. 
7  For instance, in  "Agriculture dans !'evolution de Ia crise mondiale" (Paris Alcan  1933), 
it is pointed out "that Argentina can extract from its soil, whenever it so wishes, all  the 
products of both tropical and temperate regions. It is a country with exceptional future 
potential". 
8  OECD and EU series show that the average drop in production is 20-25% for cereals, but 
40-45% for milk and meat. 8 
B.  Agriculture and agro-industries in deep crisis 
The  following  analysis  seems  broadly  valid for all  six  countries  studied.  There  are 
nonetheless some very  real  differences in  the history of agriculture, the structures of 
production  and  processing  and the  characteristics of the  labour force  in  the various 
countries.  The variable mix of these factors  explains why  the scale and form of the 
farming  crisis  is  not  the  same  in  Poland  as  it  is  in  Bulgaria.  For  instance,  the 
agricultural markets and the way they operate will not be the same in a country with 
a large number of individual farmers who own their inputs as in a country where most 
production is in the hands of large-sized centralized production units. But despite these 
differences, which can only be examined systematically by individual monographs, the 
farming crisis shows common traits which can be identified in all  the countries. The 
following phenomena are the main constant components of the crisis. 
1.  Trend towards farmland privatization 
It is  easy  to  understand  the  political  obligation  facing  the  CEEC  leaders  after  the 
collapse of the communist regimes to  declare their will  to  privatize State farms  and 
cooperatives. This "agrarian reform" in reverse is being implemented differently in the 
various countries:  extremely strictly in the Czech Republic, where former landowners 
can claim their full  rights, with the result that a party of landowners has been formed 
and is represented in Parliament; in a disorderly fashion in Bulgaria, where, because of 
the lack of any  recent land registry, the former cooperative members are sharing out 
land,  infrastructure  and  livestock  in  an  ad hoc  way,  and,  when  sharing  cannot  be 
organized  easily,  equipment  is  destroyed  (irrigation  systems)  or  abandoned 
(glasshouses); in a very complex fashion in Poland, where the State Agency responsible 
for privatizing State farms is marketing farm property very  cautiously  (I  0 000 ha a 
year)  while a good number of cooperatives are transforming themselves into private 
companies with their old leaders still in  managerial positions. 
The process of land privatization, in its legal and practical aspects, is at different stages 
of advancement in the various countries, but it shows common traits throughout:  the 
legal  insecurity  in  which  farm  owners or tenants fmd  themselves in  the absence of 
almost any  of the instruments needed for the management and recreation of private 
ownership; the lack of  cash required for the transfer of a significant portion of  the land, 
and the  consequent lack  of a land market;  the  extreme reluctance of the traditional 
managers of agriculture, government officials, researchers or farm managers, to destroy 
vast production units, some of which were far from bereft of technical rationality. For 
the time being, the only formula whereby State farms can be brought rapidly back into 
production is to rent them out, and some political and administrative leaders are 9 
wondering if this is not a suitable formula for the future.  At all  events, the hesitations 
and discussions suggest that land privatization will, for a fairly long time to come, cause 
instability  and  disorganization  of production.  There  is  no  doubt  that  it  is  partly 
responsible for the general fall  in production. 
2.  Disorganization and contraction of internal agricultural markets and breakdown of 
supply systems 
The systems which  used  to  supply  the farm  production sector with various types of 
inputs and those which placed farm products at the disposal of the population are all 
seriously impaired. Although the large production units still manage to obtain fertilizer 
and seed, admittedly in quantities far inferior to their requirements, and "commandeer" 
machinery and vehicles in the areas surrounding their place of operation, the individual 
farmers are all experiencing immense difficulties in obtaining the inputs they need, and 
· in most cases cannot pay for in any case. Although the old systems of  food distribution, 
often organized around the  production  units,  were  rigid and  full  of flaws,  they  still 
managed to provide the population as a whole with food rations of adequate quality and 
satisfactory quantity. Today they are in total disarray and have not yet been replaced by 
proper markets or modem methods of distribution. 
This widespread disorganization of the upstream and downstream links of agricultural 
production is apparent in the least advanced countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 
but, even in the more advanced countries where the organization of supply used to be 
more or less satisfactory, the breakdown of the old system is so total that the networks 
are extremely disorganized. 
And they  too  are affected by  the market recession:  the withdrawal  of subsidies, the 
decline in the purchasing power of wage-earning urban populations9, the rising prices 
of inputs combine to cause price increases in farm products, a contraction of demand 
which  causes  both  a  drop  in  production  and  a  drop  - sometimes  very  steep  - in 
consumptioniO.  For  instance,  it  is  estimated  that  per  capita  milk  consumption  in 
Slovakia has dropped by  half since I99I. 
9  It is estimated that in the CEEC actual average national income per head has fallen by 20-
25% from the maximum levels attained at the end of  the 80s (  cf "Le courrier des Pays de 
l'Est", No 383, October I993). 
I 0  Since I989 the drop in per capita consumption is reported as between 40% in Romania 
and  I 0% in Poland (  cf "Courrier des Pays de l'Est"). These figures are approximate and 
concern total consumption and standard of living. 10 
The lack of any effective system for stabilizing farmgate prices - despite the existence 
of  public or semi-public market support authorities in most of  the countries- means that 
farm producers are unable to earn sufficient extra income to improve their methods of 
production I1. We therefore witness a decline in production, a deterioration of quality 
and irregularities of supply on a patchwork of markets. In several countries and many 
regions the consumption of meat is a luxury no longer within everyone's reach. Finally, 
the arrival of processed farm products from EU countries on the markets of major cities 
has elbowed out local  products:  in  Sofia there  is  more French cheese, Danish pork, 
Dutch  tomato  concentrate  and  Greek  pasta  than  there  is  of equivalent  Bulgarian 
products. In the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, the disorganization has facilitated 
the installation of foreign  distributor chains, which  naturally purvey products of EU 
origin. Two market situations are paradoxically superimposed on each other: the arrival 
of  growing quantities of  "western" goods to satisfy the demand of  the better-off sections 
of the population, the decline of national production and the fall  in food consumption 
by the sections of the population with falling incomes. This makes it more tempting for 
EU producers  to  export their surpluses  at artificially  low pricesi2 to  the  depressed 
eastern markets. This shows how the EU could contribute "from the top" and "from the 
bottom" towards the deterioration of agricultural markets and the decline in production 
in the CEEC. This risk seems to be more than hypothetical and we therefore maintain 
that if it proves impossible to secure better market protection and growth of production 
by individual farmers or groups by ensuring price levels which permit investment as 
well as an  adequate reward for labour, nothing will prevent a worsening of the crisis. 
There have already been drops in production in the order of 20-50%. 
3.  Loss of main external market 
The former USSR was the main customer for the agricultural producers of the CEEC. 
The  relations  existing  in  the  COMECON enabled Poland, Hungary  and Bulgaria to 
supply farm products and processed products to their large neighbour in the East, often 
under a swap system whereby they received power, industrial products and capital goods 
in return. These flows have now been sharply and substantially reduced, and those that 
remain are organized through hidden channels or under conditions which destabilize the 
II  see below. 
I2  In January  I994 French pork producers called for another I 00 000 t of production to be 
channelled to Eastern European countries  with  export subsidies (  cf.  Le Monde,  I6-17 
January  1994  ). 11 
CEEC production  systems still further.  Poland,  for instance,  is regularly  obliged  to 
protect itself against  the arrival  of livestock products from Ukraine, sold at low prices 
to the great anger of Polish farmers' organizations. 
As  a result of the disorganization of the main external market for CEEC  farmers, the 
almost mythical prospect of  EU markets has assumed greater proportions in the eyes of 
the  leaders  and  farm  producers  of the  CEEC  countries.  It is  true  that  exports  of 
agricultural and processed farm products from the CEEC to the EU rose from ECU 1.65 
billion in  1988 to  ECU 2.51  billion in  1991, representing a 52% increase.  But at the 
same  time  Community  exports  to  the  CEEC  rose  from  ECU 0. 71  billion  to 
ECU 1.8 billion, which represents a growth of 167%.  The EU therefore improved its 
trade balance from - ECU 0.95 billion in 1988 to - ECU 0.7 billion in  1991. In 1992 
and  1993  the growth of EU exports continued, whereas CEEC  exports fell,  with  the 
result that in  1993  the trade balance was  positive for the EU13.  These figures  belie 
many  prejudices  and  common  assumptions.  Contrary  to  the  impressions  of western 
agricultural  leaders,  the  EU  is  improving  its  performance  vis-a-vis  the  CEEC  and 
"profiting"  from  the  new situation.  Similarly,  and  contrary  to  what  is  claimed  by 
political and agricultural leaders in the CEEC, producers in the CEEC are selling more 
farm products in the EU than they did in the past. But it is equally true that the increase 
is far from offsetting the loss of the old Soviet market. Whence the dissatisfaction, or 
even anger, of CEEC leaders in the face of  the difficulties they experience in increasing 
their exports to  the EU and the bitterness they  express  as  they  realize that  western 
outlets are not "drawing up"  their production levels. This external factor, which is not 
likely  to  change  significantly  in  the  near future,  combines  with  the  disarray  of the 
domestic markets to drag down production. Is there any  way of helping the CEEC to 
regain at least some of  the outlets that the former USSR once offered? This is a difficult 
question because of its monetary aspects, but it needs to be looked at. 
4.  Random process of modernization 
We are convinced, like most specialists and observers, that the potential  agronomic, 
geographical, technical and human capacities of the main farming countries of the area 
is significant. But they must be blended in an effective and productive way, in a process 
of modernization comparable to that which farming in the EU countries went through 
in the years following the second world war.  The fact is, however, that  the dramatic 
lack of  cash, the disarray of  industry, the shutdown of many undertakings supplying the 
inputs and equipment needed for modem farm  production are combining to,  at best, 
block production  at its pre-1989 level,  and,  at worst,  pull  it into a downward spiral. 
13  Eurostat figures, cf.  Annex 4. 12 
This  situation  is  clearly  reflected in  the  declining  level  of mechanization of the old 
production structures. With the exception of a few cases, which seem mainly due to the 
installation of agribusinesses from EU countries having a spillover effect, in technical 
terms,  on  their  productive  environment,  the  global  productivity  of  labour  and 
management is at a standstill, or even declining. 
The  conditions  for  the  beneficial  knock-on  effects  of modernization,  namely  an 
expanding  market,  remunerative  prices,  growth  of employment  in  non-agricultural 
sectors and cheap capital, are not met and there seem to be no immediate prospects of 
any notable improvement in productivity. 
5.  Inflation and agrimonetary problems 
Inflation  rates  are  generally  high  in  the  CEEC  relative  to  the  EU,  with  the current 
·exception of  the Czech Republic, but are quite different between the different countries. 
At some stage, a higher inflation rate in country A as compared to country B will lead 
to  a depreciation of the currency of country A relative to the currency of country B. 
Such a depreciation or currency devaluation becomes necessary when the overvaluation 
of the local currency to other currencies cheapens import prices and increases export 
prices  to  an  extent that  the  economy  of country A  becomes  uncompetitive  and  its 
balance of payments deficit mounts. 
Subsequent to a devaluation of its currency, the government of the country in question 
will try to keep down domestic wages and prices of  domestic production. Otherwise the 
positive economic effect of the devaluation will be lost quickly. This applies especially 
to  the prices of foods  which  can  be  considered as  essentials.  As  far  as  cereals  and 
oilseeds are concerned price ceilings below certain levels can be counterproductive in 
that production can thereby be decreased below required levels. 
Cost prices of cereals consist of a number of cost  categories.  These  cost  categories 
include land, labour, taxes, machinery, seed, fertilizer, insecticide, herbicide and fuel. 
All this adds up to a cost price in the order of 140-200 dollars per ton of grain in the 
EU, depending on the scale of production. In this cost price there is a "hard core" of 
expenses which must be covered in order for a farmer to continue production14. This 
"hard core"  of expenses includes "bought" inputs of fuel, some machinery, fertilizers, 
herbicides  and  pesticides,  as  well  as  the  labour  cost  per man,  on  the  basis  of the 
minimum effective wage cost applicable locally. 
14  "Hard core" production costs do not include: return on capital cost of  land rent, return and 
depreciation  on  capital  employed  in  buildings,  machinery,  and  stocks,  the difference 
between "normal" labour cost and the "minimum" labour cost calculated in the "hard core" 
production costs.  An estimate of these  additional  costs, expressed on  the basis of the 
production of one ton of cereals, would be 50-75 dollars in the EU and 30-40 dollars in 
the CEEC(PECO). 13 
"Bought" inputs are largely priced internationally and consequently have very similar 
costs everywhere.  Assuming relatively  normal  inputs and input costs  with  relatively 
normal yields, the "hard core" costs based on small scale production in the CEEC would 
split  up  into  25  dollars  per ton  of cereals  for  labour  and  50-60 dollars  per ton  for 
"bought" inputs, giving a total of 75-85 dollars per ton. For small scale production on 
average in the EU, "hard core" costs would be in the order of 60-70 dollars per ton for 
labour and 60 dollars per ton for "bought" inputs, giving a total of 120-130 dollars per 
ton. (On a scale of production of 100-150 hectares, "hard core" costs in the EU would 
decline to 20-25  dollars per ton for labour and 60 dollars per ton for "bought" inputs 
or 80-85 dollars per ton in total). 
In the EU, because of the complicated agrimonetary system invented in the framework 
of the CAP, a devaluation of a currency of a member country relative to the "strong" 
currency almost immediately results in an increase in agricultural prices in the devaluing 
country  to  the extent of the  devaluation.  This  process  leads  to  windfall  profits  for 
producers  in  devaluing  member  countries  who  are  compensated  for  non-occurring 
increases in a number of costs such as land, labour, and machinery. Even if some of 
these costs increased, they would be increased with a time-lag and certainly not prior 
to the subsequent crop year. 
However, in the case of the CEEC, actual prices are mainly already at, or below, "hard 
core" cost prices which must be expressed in dollars or ecu. If  prices in local currencies 
are not increased by the percentage of the devaluation, they will not cover "hard core" 
costs and production will decline subsequently. With all renewable resources, such as 
cereals, producers are at the mercy of the markets once crops are planted. Producers 
consequently usually consider replacement prices relative to actual cost at the time of 
the  start of production.  If a  devaluation  occurs  during  a  crop  year,  it  may  not be 
necessary to compensate producers provided it is certain that compensation will be made 
for devaluations affecting the crop to be harvested in the subsequent crop year. 
It  must be recognized that prices for agricultural products in the CEEC generally are at 
present at levels which induce reduction of  production. Further reductions in these prices 
in  dollar  or  ecu  terms  (due  to  currency  devaluations)  may  cause  situations  as  in 
Argentina  after  1955  where  producers  turned  to  a  survival  strategy  of the  lowest 
production  at  the  lowest  cost.  Once producers  lose  confidence  and tum  to  such  a 
strategy, it becomes extremely difficult to restore confidence and to induce a return to 
normal agricultural production. 
C.  Priority: to end the crisis 
In  view of the foregoing,  there is  nothing  in  the general  economic situation of the 
CEEC or in the particular situation of the agricultural industry to  indicate that  their 
production  and export  capacities  will improve  to any  significant degree in the near 14 
future.  On the contrary, a steady deterioration in  production systems and a deepening 
of  the  agricultural  crisis,  with  all  its  attendant  economic,  social  and  political 
consequences, are to be feared. 
It is true that the picture is not uniform for all  countries:  Poland and Hungary are in 
relatively better positions than Slovakia and, above all, Bulgaria and Romania, but the 
syndrome is  the  same  throughout:  not only  do  the  agricultural  and  food  processing 
industries fail to contribute, as might be hoped, to overall economic growth, but, on the 
contrary, their disarray could drag several countries in the area into unpredictable and 
dramatic social upheavals. This prospect is neither morally acceptable nor compatible 
with the political interests of the European Union.  The EU must face this major crisis 
with lucidity and take what steps it can, without delay, to prevent its aggravation, even 
if the eventual consequences of such a courageous policy are sharper competition and 
increased tension within the framework of the CAP. 
This conviction is founded on straightforward historical and geopolitical realities. The 
farming and food processing sectors are decisively important for all the CEEC, with the 
exception  perhaps of the  Czech  Republic.  They  provide jobs for  large  numbers  of 
workers who are unable to find other work and their contribution to national wealth is 
three to four times greater than that of western agricultural industries. There can be no 
transition to a balanced market economy capable of association with the EU economies 
without an agricultural and farm processing economy which is also associated with the 
farming  sectors  of the  EU  in  a  wider  context,  whatever  the  nature  and  degree  of 
integration. The corollary of this reasoning is that, with a view to enlargement, the EU 
must make it a priority to help the CEEC agricultural industries to recover. As regards 
the competition which these industries will one day present for the protected farming 
industries of the EU, it is relevant to point out that all the agricultural industries of the 
EU countries made prodigious progress in terms of productivity as soon as they  were 
brought into .  .  . competition with each other! 
It would naturally be unrealistic to nourish the illusion, either inside or outside the EU, 
that the Union  could itself organize such  a recovery, for  instance by  opening up  its 
markets,  as  if the  causes  of the  crisis  in  the  CEEC  were  essentially  external.  In 
particular, it is clear that as long as the production of basic farm products fails to pay 
for the inputs, any policy of recovery is doomed. But the EU can contribute powerfully 
to  the  success  of a recovery  policy  by  refraining from  any  action  which  would  be 
counter  to  the  major  objective of stabilizing  production,  and  by  taking  a  series of 
initiatives which could provide some of the means of stabilization which are lacking at 
present. 15 
IT.  AGRICULTURAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  Stabilization of prices of agricultural production 
The total volume of  consumption of  food depends on the evolution of  purchasing power. 
The sharp reduction of purchasing power of the populations in the CEEC has caused 
surprisingly large reductions in food consumption during the last three years. Production 
has also gone down, in some cases to an extent that prices for certain food products in 
certain  CEEC  have  become  extremely  unstable.  Examples  are  the  price  of pork  in 
Slovakia, which more than doubled between June and October 1993  and the price of 
wheat in Hungary which doubled between August and October 1993. 
In  both  cases  the  prices  from  which  the  price  advances  started  were  very 
unremunerative to producers, but the higher October prices were far above cost prices. 
In the case of  the wheat price evolution in Hungary, most producers could not hold back 
their wheat to wait for remunerative prices and the price rise served to benefit mostly 
others than producers. 
In the present situation, prices for agricultural products in the CEEC are generally so 
low and unstable that producers cannot count on being remunerated for their cost of 
production. As indicated earlier, this will lead to further reductions in production and 
to a loss of confidence in the profit potential of normal agricultural production which 
will be difficult to reverse. 
It seems evident that CEEC agricultural producers must be given the firm prospect of 
potentially remunerative production in order to induce them to continue, or return to, 
normal  economic production. The only  practical way  to  achieve this would be some 
form  of stabilization  of agricultural  prices  above  the  level  of the  "hard  core"  of 
production costs. 
1.  Free market approaches 
Ideally,  agricultural  production  should always  be  conducted  competitively,  allowing 
comparative  advantage  to  determine  the  pattern  of  this  production.  In  such 
circumstances, the  CEEC  could have a structural  advantage for primary  agricultural 
production relative to developed countries such as those in the EU. This approach would 
have  the  advantage  not  only  of. lightening  the  CEEC  public  spending  budgets 
considerably,  as  they  would not be  obliged to  finance  support systems,  but also  of 
making it easier for the CEEC to find international outlets at world market prices. 
However, the CEEC  currently have substantial  disadvantages in their own economic 
structures and in relation to competition from subsidized primary agricultural exports 
by the EU, the USA, and other developed agricultural producers. 16 
Internal agricultural market structures in the CEEC 
While the CEEC can produce primary agricultural products at prices comparable to the 
subsidized prices of exports from  the EU and the USA, their storage,  logistics,  and 
marketing  capacity  are  extremely  deficient.  In  the  former  political  configuration, 
products  were  basically  continuously  dispatched  to  the  former  Soviet  Union.  State 
trading organizations which might have provided marketing and logistic capacity have 
largely  been  dismantled.  It will  take time,  incentives  and  money  to  create  a  viable 
trading and distribution system for export as well as for internal marketing. 
Meantime,  several  CEEC  governments  (Poland,  Slovakia,  Romania)  have  already 
established price supports for cereals and milk production. In some cases, the levels of 
these price supports are higher than required for this purpose. The excessively high price 
levels could however easily be corrected through depreciation of  most CEEC currencies. 
But it will be difficult to dissuade CEEC governments from using price support systems 
in view of their desire to  emulate Western agricultural systems. It has to  be borne in 
mind that with the exception of New Zealand no other developed country in the world 
does without some form of direct or indirect price support mechanisms. 
The reflections on a liberal system of primary agricultural production should also take 
account of the following: since it is probable in the foreseeable future that, in one or all 
categories of agricultural production in the CEEC, production will decline to below the 
level of local demand during a crop year, prices should normally respond upward for 
the agricultural production so affected. This might be true to some extent but the fact 
is that producers are short of money and will sell their production quickly after harvest. 
In an  illiquid economy, this will  push  prices down.  Shortages of production will  be 
recognized  later  and  consequent  price  increases  will  probably  only  benefit  a  few 
producers who have held on to their production. Governments will probably encourage 
imports if prices rise,  in  order to  push  prices down.  Under normal  circumstances, a 
typical response to temporary oversupply of  grain at harvest time would be to stimulate 
exports in some form.  But given the particular conditions of the countries concerned, 
this would not give any  certainty of selling product at the required time. ·In  fact,  the 
situation is that at harvest time (July/August) export possibilities tend to be limited and 
prices are usually rather depressed. Moreover, if  there is an overall production shortfall, 
later in the year such a policy could require more costly imports. 
There is a risk, therefore, that a free .market approach would fail to provide an adequate 
response to the basic question of getting farm production started again in the CEEC. 17 
Competition with primary agricultural products on world markets. 
Potential exploitation of their basic comparative advantage in the production of  primary 
agricultural  products  by  the  CEEC  has  to  be  evaluated  bearing  in  mind  both  the 
economic and the political feasibility of such an  approach. 
As far as the former is concerned, the observations relating the internal structures in the 
CEEC are of course relevant. Another, external, factor has to be mentioned. The major 
exporting powers like the USA and the EU, apart from subsidizing primary agricultural 
products on  world markets, employ credits, tied food grants and food aid to promote 
their exports. 
These latter secondary sales devices are not,  and will  not be,  available to the CEEC. 
The  absence  of appropriate  marketing  structures  and  the  lack  of capacity  to  use 
sophisticated marketing devices will  severely handicap,  at least initially, the CEEC's 
ability  to  exploit  their  basic  comparative  advantage  in  the  production  of primary 
agricultural products. 
Another important point must be made in this respect.  A system founded on the free 
play of market forces, within the context of the prospective accession of the CEEC to 
the EU, is conceivable only if it is accompanied by the dismantling, on the EU side, of 
export refunds, and the renunciation, on the CEEC side, of external protection for their 
markets and internal support for their farming industries. Such an approach would risk 
incurring a virulent reaction in the farming world in the EU, but also in the CEEC, and 
could jeopardize the accession of the CEEC. 
2.  Price support approach 
Only  if a government can  state at planting time that the price of the grain or other 
agriculture  product  at  harvest  time  will  be  guaranteed  to  be  somewhat  (barely) 
remunerative,  is  it  likely  that  sufficient  producer  confidence  can  be  generated  to 
continue normal  production at currently foreseeable price levels.  This would mean a 
system of price supports for primary agricultural production, namely cereals, probably 
milk and sugar, possibly meat and oilseeds. 
The EU has ample experience with such programmes (and the mistakes which can be 
made  in  their  design  and  ex:ecution).  Consequently,  it  could  contribute 
knowhow/personnel to  stabilization efforts, if required. 
The levels of the price supports will be important. If too low (below the "hard core" 
production costs) price supports could be close to useless; if  too high, they might create 
a situation similar to  the one encountered in the  EU where production is  geared to 
intervention rather than markets. 
The level at which CEEC price supports are started is of vital importance since it will 
form the base from which the supports will evolve. 18 
At the outset of the PAC, for  reasons of political expediency, Dr Mansholt accepted 
agricultural  price  levels  which  were  much  too  high  economically.  He  hoped  and 
expected that these price levels would be reduced by market forces in a relatively short 
time span. Instead, it took 30 years of price distortion in agriculture before a start was 
made with such downward price adjustments. 
Since  the  "hard  core"  production  costs  are  mainly  in  materials  that  are  traded 
internationally,  the  price  support  levels  at  the  start  of a  crop  year  would  best  be 
denominated in dollars or ecu and subsequently in the local currency equivalent of the 
dollar  price  support.  The  cost  prices  of agricultural  products  in  the  CEEC  are 
remarkably  similar in  dollar/ecu  terms.  After  the  start  of a  crop  year,  it would  be 
possible to leave the intervention prices in local currencies unchanged for the course of 
the crop year, provided the new intervention prices for the following crop year were 
announced in a timely fashion based on cost prices in dollars/ecu. 
Import and export systems are a natural complement to internal price support systems. 
They  should be coordinated between the EU and the CEEC  so  as  to  prevent further 
distortions. 
The current agreement between the CEEC and the EU has not had the positive effect 
on exports to  the EU from  the CEEC that these countries had hoped for.  Exports of 
agricultural products to the EU have increased a little while (subsidized) exports from 
the EU to the CEEC have increased sharply. The general sentiment in the CEEC is that 
the agreement is unfavourable for them.  This has created a great deal of bitterness in 
CEEC circles, whether justified or not, as  indicated above. 
As  from  now,  efforts  should  be  made  to  evolve  the  export-import  relationship  in 
agricultural products between EU and CEEC towards a constructive partnership with the 
aim  of restoring  CEEC  agriculture  to  a  healthy  footing  by  supporting  attempts  to 
stabilize agricultural prices in the CEEC. 
Levy-free quotas for imports into the EU from CEEC and credits granted by the EU for 
export of agriculture  products  from  CEEC  to  the  former  Soviet Union,  or to  other 
importers, do not bring structural solutions for CEEC agricultural marketing problems. 
Moreover, these  "facilities"  are  extremely  difficult to  administer in  the absence of a 
central marketing agency in each CEEC. The question as to who will benefit from these 
"facilities" in the CEEC (and in the.EU) cannot be decided objectively. Consequently, 
substantial economic/financial benefits inherent in these "facilities" are allocated in an 
arbitrary fashion. 
Quotas  with  preferential  treatment  of tariffs  or levies  on  imports  into  the  EU  are 
economically  inefficient.  There  is  a  tendency  to fill  these  quotas  regardless  of the 
economics involved, since otherwise another market participant  might benefit.  Since 
there  is no  quick  information  available  on  whether a quota has already been filled, 19 
an importer will tend to act to safeguard himself from the risk that he may have to pay 
the tariff or levy applicable to transactions outside the quota. In practice, importers into 
the EU will tend to capture the benefits intended for exporters to the EU in the CEEC. 
EU import levies on CEEC primary products like cereals should be lowered to allow 
the CEEC to export to the EU in the event of local price declines below support prices. 
This would give a great deal of credibility to local price support actions and generally 
have a positive psychological effect. In practice, the quantities which could be available 
for export to the EU would be limited. It might be advisable in this context to introduce 
a monitoring system of mutual trade flows. 
EU import levies on CEEC consumer foods should allow imports of  these products into 
the EU while EU export refunds on consumer foods to the CEEC should not be such 
as to take away local markets from local production. A restrictive system of quotas is 
an  effective way to  throttle market development. 
One approach would be to recognize the cost price differences between CEEC and EU 
primary agricultural products and to extrapolate from these differences the cost price 
differences between consumer products in  a limited number of categories and then to 
use these price differences,  adjusted for  transportation  costs,  both  as  EU levies  and 
refunds when importing from, or exporting to, the CEEC. The money that the EU would 
collect on levies and save on export refunds, compared with the export refunds normally 
granted, could in fact facilitate the granting of financial assistance to the CEEC. 
Obviously  such  an  approach  is  of an  innovative  nature  and  needs  to  be  examined 
carefully in  all  its aspects:  management, financing,  compatibility with GA TI. GA 1T 
regulations are unlikely to prohibit EU involvement in CEEC price support operations 
or in  the setting up  of land banks. However the proposed system of EU import levies 
and export refunds is philosophically different from the current system of  EU levies and 
export refunds. This could create problems in GATT where other countries could claim 
the right to equal treatment  IS. 
Feasibility of the system 
We are aware of the manifold difficulties our proposal will face, and we know it runs 
counter to many suggestions proffered to the Central and Eastern European countries 
in  the past four years.  The change of approach therefore requires, on the part of EU 
leaders,  the  political  courage  to  affirm  a voluntarist  objective,  both  vis-a-vis their 
15  See in Annex I an illustration of how such a price support system could function. 20 
counterparts  in  the  West - especially  the  USA  - and  vis-a-vis  their counterparts  in 
Central and Eastern Europe, who, while appealing for a clear position on the part of  the 
Union, still harbour numerous illusions as to its possible content. 
Furthermore, the implementation of this system of stabilization will have to overcome 
some real  difficulties.  The first stems from the diversity of situations of the farming 
industries  in  the  CEEC  and  the  different  levels  of development  attained.  Must the 
system  be the  same throughout?  Is that necessary?  Is it feasible?  We have already 
addressed this question in the context of our general diagnosis, and we think the answer 
is still the same: despite the geographical, historical and organizational differences, the 
farming industries of the CEEC are going through a crisis whose main features are so 
similar in the various countries that the remedies can hardly be very different. It is just 
as  urgently  necessary  to  stabilize the prices  paid to  producers in  Poland as  it  is  in 
Romania. Moreover, an  identical price stabilization system in all the CEEC will have 
the advantage of encouraging trade between them and inducing them to adopt similar 
agricultural  policies.  It will  function  as  it has  done  in  Western  Europe,  where  the 
differences between farming systems are easily as  great as they  are in the CEEC, by 
drawing together the markets and standardizing practices. 
The second difficulty stems from the fact that such a system entails rising budget costs. 
The sums to be mobilized in order to stabilize the key products remain acceptable, but 
it is  easy  to  imagine the pressures that the farming  world will  put on  the decision-
makers in order to raise the level of guarantee. The only response to this risk is to lock 
the  system  before  it starts  to  function,  by  fixing  budget  envelopes  in  advance  and 
defining clearly the decision-making procedures for changes to the guarantee levels. It 
is the lack of any limit on the CAP mechanisms which has caused it to drift off course, 
not the mechanisms themselves. 
A third difficulty stems from the GATT agreements. Is the system as described above 
compatible with the rules recently adopted, which will be applied within the framework 
of the WTO.  The elements of the proposed system are different and do  not have the 
same purpose as the old levy/refund system applied in the EU. Nevertheless, some third 
countries  could legitimately  ask  to  benefit from  such  a system,  in  the name of fair 
treatment and equality. But there is one possible solution to this, which calls for more 
detailed  exploration,  namely  to  get  the  international  community  to  recognize  the 
particular status and limited duration of the proposed stabilization mechanism: it is to 
be  a transitional  system,  specific  to  the  phase preceding  accession,  and  intended to 
enable the CEEC to halt the decline.of their farming industries and prepare themselves 
in the best conditions for their subsequent adherence to the rules - now recognized- of 
the reformed CAP. 
These difficulties are undeniable but surely not insurmountable. We think things should 
be set in  train  without delay  to  make the  implementation of the stabilization policy 
feasible, for it seems to  us essential if further enlargement is to be achieved in good 
conditions  for the  EU and  CEEC.  If nothing  is  put  in place in the near future, the 21 
social  and  political  tensions  already  apparent  among  EU  farmers  and  the  bitter 
disillusionment of farmers in the CEEC  will become more acute and risk leading to 
deadlock  situations,  or even  eruptions of discontent. It is high time to propose that 
CEEC farmers embark on the path that will lead them progressively towards their fellow 
farmers in the West. 
B.  The development of a sound agricultural credit system 
The setting  up  of a  price  stabilization  system  is  a  prerequisite of any  recovery  of 
agriculture in the CEEC. It alone will prevent farmers from going bankrupt. Once the 
system is in place,  it will  be necessary  to turn to  other crucial  reform measures to 
enable CEEC farmers to develop and modernize their production. In this respect, the 
establishment of  a sound agricultural credit system has to be given high priority because 
it will allow the restructuring of CEEC agriculture (impact on scale of production and 
creation of liquid assets). 
The current tendencies are to fragment land ownership into units which are uneconomic 
for modem agriculture. In Poland 70% of the land was already owned and operated in 
very small scale units while in most other CEEC privatization also seems to be leading 
back to ownership as existed 50 years ago, largely in small lots. 
In  order to  restructure  agriculture  into  economically  more  viable  units,  it  will  be 
necessary  to  give  land  some  reasonable  value  for  sale  and/or  rent.  Generally,  in 
loss-making agriculture the value of land is  small,  especially  where there exists on 
overhang of land waiting to be privatized. This is further compounded by the general 
lack of credit in the CEEC economies. 
Credit problems in all these countries are aggravated by the fact that there is no legal 
framework for collecting debt and forcing companies and individuals into bankruptcy 
in the case of non-payment. 
This is creating domino debt default situations whereby enterprises cannot pay their 
creditors because they are not being paid by their debtors. 
Since in some areas more than 50% of agricultural producers and agro-industries seem 
to be insolvent and not paying on debt, governments are understandably reluctant to 
force all these people into bankruptcy even if a legal procedure allowing this did exist. 
All these countries lack a system of.rural banks which might be able to police a system 
of input credits. 
In these circumstances, land would seem to be the only viable collateral for agricultural 
credit. In order to realize land as collateral for credit a number of  pre-conditions should 
be met. 
Ownership rights should be clear, there should be legal means by which to take over 
collateralized land in case of  non-payment, and, most important of all, there should be 
a liquid market for land. This is not now the case. 22 
These  preconditions  are  so  important for  the  proper functioning  of the  agricultural 
structures that they should have a high degree of  priority in discussions between the EU 
and the CEEC. 
Current value of farmland in most CEEC lies around USD 200-300/hectare, but very 
little land is bought and sold. Even in remote South American areas, the value of land 
of lesser  productive  potential  than  in  CEEC  has  a  current  market  value  of USD 
750/hectare. 
As an  adjunct to price support for production, CEEC require a system to support land 
prices and to liquify the land market in such a way that there can be a gradual evolution 
to production units of an economic scale. Possibly even more important is that in this 
way the value of land can be mobilized as collateral for essential credits to agricultural 
producers. 
While the organizations in the different CEEC  engaged in the privatization of public 
land could be transformed into instruments to manage the purchase and sale of  farmland 
and so establish clearing prices for land,  it might be more expedient to start up  new 
"land bank" entities in order to obtain private foreign finance. 
The establishment of "land banks" should be examined in each CEEC, in combinations 
between private investors, local governments, EBRD, World Bank, and EU. These "land 
banks"  would attempt to liquify the market for land by  buying and selling land, also 
taking account of the desirability of establishing an economic scale of production (see 
in Annex II an  example of how land banks could operate). 
ill.  FLANKING MEASURES 
Introduction 
The foregoing pages, which concern price stabilization and credit systems, present the 
core of our proposals, the essential content of an agricultural policy which seems to us 
appropriate  to  the  present  situation  prior  to  enlargement.  Its  adoption  and 
implementation depend on the reception it receives from the Commission, the latter's 
willingness  to  propose  clear  and  precise  objectives  to  the  CEEc  on  matters  of 
agricultural policy, the reactions of the Member States, which may have contradictory 
but  equally  strong  reasons  for  putting  up  with  the  present  crisis,  and,  finally,  the 
reception the proposals receive from the leaders of the CEEC. 
However,  without waiting for  each  and everyone to  agree on the proposals, if it is 
thought they have any chance of being implemented in the manner described above or 
in a similar manner, it would be desirable and effective to reflect as from now upon the 
ways and means of applying this policy in preparation for enlargement and to explore 
the possible "flanking measures" which can, in most cases, be decided unilaterally by 
the EU in order to facilitate the gradual convergence of the agricultural policies of the 
Union and the CEEC. 23 
This  forward-looking  attitude  no  doubt  pre-supposes  that the  destination  is  clearly 
defined, if not yet decided, and that the agricultural industries of the CEEC are fully 
familiar to the officials and decision-makers of the EU. This is essential. For instance, 
how can  an  in-depth reform of the market regime for beef be prepared without due 
regard for the fact that, in a few years' time, the Polish and Hungarian beef producers 
will take part in the regime? 
The flanking measures which we propose for immediate implementation are intended 
to induce the people involved to work towards rapprochement, to discuss and compare 
their instruments and practices, for the explicit purpose of being in a position, in a few 
years' time, to operate the same mechanisms. 
A.  Reinforcement of economic and human links 
·If  we accept that on either side there is a need to make up considerable ground in terms 
of mutual knowledge, the EU must make rapid preparations to introduce itself and its 
ideas to its CEEC partners, while at the same time improving its own knowledge and 
understanding of Central and Eastern Europe. 
With  regard  to  the  agricultural  sector,  the  EU  could  negotiate  soon  with  the 
governments of the CEEC  to  initiate two types of action:  the first would consist in 
training some high-level officials and farming leaders in the technical mechanisms and 
development of the CAP, the second,  equally  important, would consist in trying to 
inform a more extensive audience of agricultural professionals about the realities and 
myths of the CAP. If this work is not undertaken very soon, in a systematic way, the 
EU will experience great difficulties during the negotiations and will run major risks of 
political misunderstanding because ignorance about the real nature of the CAP seems 
to be severe and widespread. 
The EU will  have to bear this in mind if it is to proceed fruitfully  with negotiations 
with  the CEEC.  These  will  require  more structured and  intensive personal  contacts 
between the EU and CEEC, governments and officials, than was necessary in previous 
contacts and negotiations concerning the possible access of western countries. 
It is consequently recommended that the EU should organize a small group of experts 
in agriculture, dedicated to the question of cooperation with the official bodies in the 
CEEC. 
However, even if the group is composed of highly qualified persons, it cannot take the 
place  of the  real  leaders  of the  EU  responsible  for  determining,  expressing  and 
monitoring the policy of the Union in this matter. A steering group for our agricultural 
relations with the CEEC must also be set up. It is not for us to suggest who should be 
in charge of this dossier, but it seems necessary and urgent to designate a "top person" 
to report to the Commission and possibly also to the Council of Ministers. 24 
Apart from  a small  support group  in  Brussels,  this  official  should have  agricultural 
"residents" in  each CEEC  at his disposal. These local "residents" should be capable of 
having constructive contacts with local ministries of agriculture and should be able to 
supervise  PHARE  activities.  They  should  be  primarily  responsible  to  the  Brussels 
official indicated above, but will have delegated responsibility in the country to which 
they  are  assigned.  Together with  the  small  coordinating group  in  Brussels, the  "EU 
agricultural  residents  or attaches"  would  constitute  the  EU  agricultural  support  and 
management team for the CEEC. 
These contacts and the confirmed presence of the EU in  the CEEC  seem  essential if 
enlargement is to be prepared in the best possible conditions. 
B.  Towards improved effectiveness of PHARE in the process of convergence 
The concept of PHARE is noble and idealistic.  With the experience gained since its 
inception, it should be possible to make this concept correspond to the goal of giving 
recipient countries a maximum of effective structural economic assistance. 
The EU should formulate clear longer-term goals for this assistance. These goals, and 
the priorities within these goals, will require political decision which can only be taken 
at  the  political  level.  Leaving  initiatives  in  relation  to  PHARE  Agriculture  to  the 
somewhat nebulous PHARE organizations at ministries in recipient countries is putting 
rather  too  much  responsibility  on  these  structures  than  can  currently  be  managed 
usefully. 
Projects  undertaken  in  the  recipient  countries  should  fit  into  the  clear  longer-term 
political orientation of  PHARE Agriculture, and the resulting priorities, suggested above. 
If at all possible, PHARE Agriculture projects should initially be rather "concrete" with 
a finite time horizon. Projects undertaken in any one recipient country should be limited 
in number at any time in order to ensure that these projects are "followed up" carefully 
and efficiently by the proposed local agricultural "residents". The initiation of a great 
number of  small and somewhat indeterminate projects should be avoided. Moving from 
the accomplishment/completion of one project to the start of another, building on the 
experience  gained  previously,  would  seem  to  be  the  way  to  move  in  PHARE 
agricultural projects. 
Contrary to the experience of the EU in previous accessions, it must be recognized that 
in proceedings with the CEEC it cannot be assumed that counterparts in these countries 
will  understand  what EU officials  want  to convey,  and vice  versa.  The  working of 
CEEC  governmental  structures is not apparent to  EU eyes  at first  sight, just as  the 
workings of the EU systems are not transparent to CEEC  officials. In the context of 
PHARE Agriculture, this means that the contacts between the EU and the individual 
CEEC  must be intensified locally  through the activities of the proposed agricultural 
"residents" in relation to the PHARE counterparts in these countries. 25 
The responsibility for the overall orientation of PHARE Agriculture, the responsibility 
for the priorities set in this orientation, and the responsibility for the individual projects, 
should be allocated and should be recognized and understood by all those involved with 
the overall PHARE Agriculture program. 
C.  Managing gradual development toward convergence of agricultural policies 
The current status of the association agreements is not considered to be satisfactory by 
any of the CEEC governments which complain about bureaucratic complications with 
the EU as well as about the negative evolution of  their agricultural balance of  trade with 
the EU. 
As  suggested  above,  it  seems  advisable  for  the  EU to  organize  a  small  body  to 
coordinate contacts with the CEEC.  Under the auspices of this body, regular monthly 
market management meetings should be held between experts of  the EU and the CEEC 
concerning three fields of agricultural exchanges: 
1.  internal market evolution (prices, supply demand) 
2.  trade development (volumes, tariffs and refunds) 
3.  veterinary  /plant health matters. 
These  market  management  meetings  could  recommend  overriding  quotas  of the 
association  agreement if they  were unnecessarily  restrictive.  On the other hand they 
would monitor trade volumes and prices in such a way that disruptive trade flows could 
be limited. They could recommend adjusting levies and refunds when so  required. No 
unilateral veterinary/plant health measures would be taken without prior consultations 
in these meetings. 
It is hoped that, out of these meetings and contacts, initiatives will  be developed for 
further  coordination  of agricultural  policies  in  time.  Since  many  bilateral  contacts 
between the EU and the CEEC will be maintained and serviced by the new form of EU 
"agricultural attaches" or "residents" in the different CEEC, it would be useful for these 
"residents"  to  attend  these  monthly  meetings  at least once  every  three  months,  but 
potentially more frequently. 
It will be vital to ensure that the officials attending these meetings on behalf of the EU 
and CEEC are actually responsible in their home territories for the matters that will be 
discussed in these meetings. 
Through these procedures, the adhesion process would be made both more flexible and 
more pragmatic.  Officials from  the CEEC  would become better acquainted with EU 
procedures and officials from the EU would become acquainted with the problems in 
the CEEC. 
Consideration must also be given to the setting-up of an EU inspection group to help 
the CEEC  with the supervision and control of tariffed or subsidized trade flows  and 
possible intervention stocks in connection with the EU. 26 
The  foregoing  suggestions,  concerning  trade,  the  PHARE  programme  and  contacts 
between  people,  all  spring  from  a  single  proposal:  after  the  period  of surprise, 
observation and benign abstention vis-a-vis the CEEC and their agricultural industries, 
the  time  has  come  for  the  EU to  act  and  assume  responsibility.  It must  define  its 
objectives, announce its will to achieve them and provide itself with the requisite means, 
while bearing in  mind all  the various  changes it  will  have to  effect by  the time 22 
countries are involved in the common agricultural policy. One difficult and disturbing 
problem suffices to illustrate our position: we know that financial, veterinary and other 
checks have become a crucial factor of the CAP.  How will they be organized in the 
CEEC,  with  all  the  difficulties  they  will  face,  when  the  countries  have  neither the 
facilities nor the personnel capable of carrying them out properly? Should this aspect 
be analysed and resolved before enlargement? 
CONCLUSION 
The enlargement of the Union to include the CEEC will undoubtedly be an  extremely 
difficult  operation:  it concerns  six  countries  with  different histories,  languages  and 
structures, whose levels of economic and social development are also different and all 
distinctly below the levels attained in the western part of  Europe. When the time comes 
for  accession,  the  CEEC  will  be  far  from  completing  their  uneasy  transition  from 
centralized economies to a market economy. What is more, the new enlargement will 
be prepared during a particularly unfavourable period, marked by  a general economic 
recession which, among the peoples of western countries and the CEEC, nourishes the 
worst kind of nationalist, protectionist and xenophobic fantasies. 
In  the  face  of this  accumulation  of all  types  of difficulty,  the  path  open  to  the 
Commission for implementing the conclusions of the European Council in June 1993 
is obviously narrow and steep: it must propose clear and strong negotiating objectives, 
capable of reassuring the present Member States and public opinion therein about the 
short-term  effects  of the  next  enlargement,  while  also  convincing  the  leaders  and 
peoples of the CEEC of the will of the European Union to  create, with them, a new 
common area,  a  .. greater Europe".  The  conception, definition  and implementation of 
such a project are all the more urgent now as public opinion will be more vigilant than 
ever before. 
Against this general background we. decided to make our report brief but outspoken so 
that it is thought-provoking and conducive to discussion. 
The proposals in the report rest entirely on the idea that the EU countries and the CEEC 
all have a major interest in working for the convergence of their economic, social and 
political systems, without thereby renouncing or overriding their respective specificities. 
There are definite advantages to choosing the agricultural sector with which to embark 
on  the  process  of convergence,  which  will be  necessarily long and marked by crises 27 
and  setbacks.  One  advantage  is  that  although  agriculture  contributes  only  a  small 
fraction of GDP it remains of strategic importance for the food supply of the nations 
concerned and for the occupation of the land. Furthermore, the CAP has given the EU 
a  unique  experience  in  the  management  of a  process  of convergence,  with  all  its 
attendant difficulties, mistakes and benefits. 
It should be possible for the proposals in  this report to be taken up  without delay to 
generate  a process  of convergence:  farmers  in  the  CEEC  will  organize  themselves 
progressively along lines similar to those applied under the CAP, seeking to retain the 
best and  reject the  worst,  while the EU will,  while opening itself to  new members, 
pursue  its  efforts  to  lighten  and  improve  the  instruments  of the  CAP,  the  two 
movements drawing strength from each other. 
This  rapprochement presupposes that national  farm  policies  are  non-conflicting  and 
compatible with the reformed CAP. In other words there must be an institutional system 
capable of inspiring,  administering and monitoring  a new and more extensive CAP. 
There can be no convergence without common procedures and verifications, given that, 
in the farming sector as elsewhere, the "invisible hand" of the market cannot regulate 
everything. 
The convergence must therefore be organized in a system of  management covering more 
than 20 Member States. It is obvious for everyone who has had any part in decision-
making  under  the  CAP  that  the  present  institutional  system  will  be  incapable  of 
functioning  with  more  than  20  countries  and  that  paralysis  will  swiftly  set  in. 
Enlargement of the EU to  include the Scandinavian countries and Austria is  already 
showing how very hard it is for the EU to take in new members and to remain a true 
community without modifying the way its institutions operate. It  is therefore clear that, 
if the  problem is not addressed before the  accession  of the  CEEC,  the EU will  be 
unable to operate as a system of convergence of national areas. 
We  have  neither  the  brief nor  the  specific  competence  to  make  proposals  about 
institutional aspects. But we know that the ordinary decisions required for the day-to-
day operation of  the CAP have to be taken fast and, where possible, taking due account 
of a rational analysis of market data, budget possibilities and common interests.  This 
is  unfeasible  in  a  Council  comprising  more  than  20  members.  But that  is  another 
matter  ... 28 
ANNEX I 
Example of a price support system for CEEC cereals 
It is suggested that the level of price support for cereals in the CEEC/ should be based 
on "hard core" costs as indicated in I-B5 and have the form of a saftey net rather than 
a commercial price level. 
The  starting  point  of the  price  support  system  would  be  the  price  level  in  local 
currency for a crop year. It  is suggested that this price level should be the local currency 
equivalent of a dollar price at the start of a crop year and that this local currency price 
would not be changed during the course of that crop year. At the start of the following 
crop year in  principle the same dollar price could be utilized,  converted to the local 
currency at the exchange rate than prevailing. This could give the following schematic 
evolution of levels of price support in a country. 
Exchange rate to dollar of currency A on I  July 1993  = 40 to 1 dollar. 
Price support level  for  93/94  crop year 85  dollars  per ton  =  3400  per ton  in local 
currency A. 
Exchange rate to dollar of currency A on 1 July  1994 =  48 to  I  dollar. 
Price support level  for  94/95  crop  year 85  dollars  per ton = 4080 per ton in  local 
currency A. 
The  EU  could  consider  changing  its  system  of  tariffs  at  import,  and 
refunds  at export,  on  agricultural products  for the  CEEC  to reflect only 
the  difference  in  product ion  costs  between  the  CEEC  and  the  EU  as 
reflected  in  the  levels  of  direct price  support.  EU  refunds  would  then 
become  the  mirror  images  of  EU  tariffs  in  relation  with  the  CEEC.  EU 
tariffs or refunds for other agricultural products could  be  derived from 
the  EU  tariffs or  refunds  for cereals through  coefficients.  It would  be 
possible  to  take  account  of  freight  expenses  from  CEEC  to  the  EU, 
probably Germany,  but this could  affect the  symmetry  between  tariffs and 
refunds.  Tariffs and  refunds  under  such  a system  would  only apply  on  the 
date  of  import  into  the  EU  c.q.  export  from  the  EU  and  not  be  fixable 
ahead. 29 
While  such  a system  would  be  very  straightforward  in  principle,  changes 
in  exchange  rates  in  the different CEEC  would  have  to be  catered for  in 
the  execution  of  such  a  system.  As  indicated  above,  support  prices  in 
local  currencies  would  not  change  during  a  crop  year  from  prices 
converted  from  dollar prices at the  start of  the  crop  year.  Adjustments 
in  EU  tariffs and  refunds  following  changes  in  exchange  rates could  take 
place  as  follows: 
Cereals  support  price  country A =  USO  85  =  ECU  62/ton  =  3400  loca 1 
currency 
EU  cereals  support  price  =  ECU  100/ton 
Consequently  tariff and  refund  could  be  ECU  38/ton  (100162) 
Currency country A  devalues  by  10%,  which  cause currency A to change from 
40  = 1 dollar to  44  = 1 dollar 
Support  price  continues  at 3400  in  local  currency of  country  A. 
This  support  price  is then  equivalent to  USO  77.25  or  ECU  56.40. 
The  tariff and  refund  would  then  go  up  to  ECU  43.60  subsequent  to  the 
devaluation  (100156.40). 
In  case  of  further devaluation  during  that crop  year  to  48  =  1 dollar, 
the  dollar equivalent  of  the  3400  support  price  would  be  ECU  70.80  or 
51.70. 
The  tariff and  refund  would  then  become  ECU  48.30  (100151.70). 
At  the  start of  the  following  crop  year,  the  support  price would  go  up 
in  local  currency  of  country A to  the  equivalent  of  USO  85/ton,  at an 
exchange  rate of 48  = 1 dollar, or to 4080/ton  in  local  currency and  the 
tariff and  refund  would  return  to  ECU  38  as  the  start of  the  previous 
crop  year. 
It is to  be  hoped  that the  same  tariffs and  refunds  could  be  applied  to 
all  CEEC  at the  start of  each  crop  year  and  that differences  in  these 
tariffs and  refunds  would  only  occur  during  a crop  year  as  a result of 
different currency  adjustments  of  different CEEC. 30 
ANNEX  II 
Example  of  the  operation  of  Land  banks  in  the  CEEC 
- The  goal  of  Land  banks  in  the  CEEC  would  be  to  establish  credit  and 
liquidity in  the  agricultural  economies  of  these countries  on  the basis 
of  collateral  and  value  of  agricultural  land. 
- The  preconditions  for such  Land  banks  would  the  following: 
1.  A  CEEC  would  accept  the  concept  of  a  Land  bank  and  would 
participate  in  some  way  in  its operation. 
2.  Agriculture  must  be  potentially  profitable  in  the  CEEC  in 
question. 
3.  Title to  land  could  be  established. 
4.  Land  could  be  legally pledged  as  collateral and  could  be  executed 
in  case  of  default. 
Title of  land  could  be  legally transferred. 
- Credit  and  liquidity could  initially be  established as  follows: 
1.  By  creating  a  liquid  market  for  land  by  being  ready  to  buy  and 
sell  land.  In  selling  land,  the  Land  bank  could  promote  the 
evolution  of  production  units of  an  economically  viable  scale. 
2.  By  creating production credits to  individual farm  operations with 
land  as  collateral,  either directly or  indirectly through  local 
banks  which  would  act as  agents  for  the  Land  bank. 
- The  operation of  a land  bank  will  require that a vast number  of  small 
transactions  are  concluded  and  administered.  Transactions  will  have  to 
be  standardized  and  will  have  to  be  administered  through  appropriate 
automated  administrative  procedures.  This  will  entail  one  contract for 
selling  land,  one  for  buying  land,  one  for  applying  for  production 
credit.  In  each  case,  such  a contract would  have  to  be  accompanied  by  a 
properly endorsed  title to the  land  in  question. 
The  land  banks  would  discount.the title to  land  that it held  with  third 
parties.  These  could  be,  for  instance,  the  Central  Bank  of  the  CEEC  in 
quest ion,  the  World  bank  and/or  EBRD,  and/or  Internat iona 1  Merchant 
Banks,  and/or private investors, whether  or not  with  guarantees from  the 
CEEC  in  question  of  from  another  guarantor. 
Production credits could  be  offered in  dollars or  in  dollar equivalent 
if  there  were  dollar  equivalent  support  prices  through  which  dollar 
credits could  be  covered.  Land  purchases  and  sales would  be  likely to be 
conducted  in  local  currencies,  although  there  would  be  no  reason  in 
principle to exclude  transactions  in  dollars or  dollar equivalents. 31 
ANNEX  III 
Comments  on  the statistics concerning agriculture and  food  processing  in 
the  CEEC 
There  is  no  shortage  of  statistical  data  on  agriculture  and  agro-
industries  in  the  CEEC:  the  OECD,  World  Bank,  Eurostat,  international 
trade  centres  in  the  Member  States,  research  institutes and  specialist 
journals all produce  their columns  of figures  and  graphs,  often derived 
from  the  same  sources  and  without  much  scientific attention to detail. 
All  this material must  be  viewed with  extreme caution by decision-makers. 
Without  being specialists in data gathering and  processing,  we  have  tried 
to check,  empirically and  roughly,  the data  and  information collected in 
the  field against  the  available figures. 
We  find  that  three  types  of  statistics  can  be  regarded  as  probably 
reliable: 
* statistics  on  use  of  agricultural  land:  the  data  collection  systems 
are  long-established,  varied  and  based  on  data  compiled  by  qualified 
geographers,  used  as  the  basis  for all  local  administration; 
*  statistics  on  land  sown  to  cereals:  the  system  is  also  long-
established, closely linked with  cartography,  the data being collected 
by  centralized bodies  and  easily and  rapidly verifiable on  the  basis 
of  the  yields  of  the  regions  concerned; 
* statistics for foreign trade with  the  EU:  these are customs  statistics 
which  can  hardly  be  cast  in  doubt. 
All  other figures  seem  unconvincing.  For  instance: 
*  the figures  showing  trade between  the  CEEC  and  CIS  take  no  account  of 
clandestine trade; 
* all  the  figures  concerning  livestock  production  are  impossible  to 
check,  and  in  most  cases  fa i 1  to  tally with  observations  at  field 
level; 
*  the  significance  of  variations  over  time  is  very  relative.  For 
instance  it  is  claimed  that  Romania's  GOP  grew  by  1%  in  1993;  but 
after a  35%  plunge  of  production  since  1990  and  an  inflation rate of 
300%  in  1993,  what  does  such  a  figure  mean  other  than  that  the 
downward  slide of  production  has  levelled out? 32 
For  these various reasons,  we  have deliberately omitted tables and  graphs 
from  this report,  except  for those  in  Annex  IV.  The  only figures  quoted 
in  the  body  of  the text are those  which  we  feel,  all other things  being 
equal,  we  can  guarantee  as  being  reliable. 
In  these circumstances,  we  would  suggest  that Eurostat  be  provided with 
a  working  party,  possibly  including  specialist  statisticians from  the 
Member  States,  to  compile  statistics for  sectors  where  it  is  already 
possible to  do  so  and  to define  the conditions for obtaining a full  set 
of reliable statistics. Without  reliable information,  how  could  we,  for 
instance,  propose  a milk  quota  to  Bulgaria  or  Romania? 33 
ANNEX  IV 
Trade  in  agricultural  and  food  products  between  the  EU  and  CEEC 
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